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Court: International Criminal Court, Appeals Chamber 
Case: In the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
Date: October 8, 2010 
Written by: Jonathon Handelman 
 
The issue was whether Trial Chamber I erred when it decided to stay the 
proceedings and release the accused upon its finding that a fair trial was no longer 
possible as a result of the Prosecution’s failure to implement an order by the Chamber.  
The Appeals Chamber agreed that the Prosecution was bound to the Chamber’s order, but 
it found that the Trial Chamber erred when it resorted to the drastic remedy of staying the 
proceedings without first using sanctions, a more appropriate tool to bring the 
Prosecution into compliance. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Dyilo) has been on trial since January 2009 for the war 
crime of enlisting children under the age of fifteen into the Patriotic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo (FPLC) and using them to participate actively in armed conflict 
between September 2002 and August 2003.  He is the alleged founder and former 
Commander-in-Chief of the FPLC. 
On October 8, 2010, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court 
overturned a decision by the Trial Chamber to stay proceedings for Dyilo’s trial.  This 
judgment concerns the Prosecutor’s appeal of the Trial Chamber’s decision of 8 July 
2010 entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-
Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings 
Pending Further Consultations with the VWU.”  
The Trial Chamber decided to stay the proceedings regarding the Prosecutor’s use 
of intermediaries, persons who introduced witnesses to the Prosecutor, or who contacted 
 2 
witnesses on his behalf, and the allegations that some intermediaries had sought to induce 
witnesses to testify falsely before the Court.  
The Trial Chamber rendered the “Decision on Intermediaries” by ordering the 
identity of intermediary 143 to be disclosed to Dyilo once the necessary protective 
measures were implemented, but the Court ultimately held that there was not a sufficient 
basis to call intermediary 143 to testify.  While no specific allegations were made against 
intermediary 143, the testimony of some of Dyilo’s witnesses put into question or 
contradicted evidence that was given by witnesses who were introduced to the Prosecutor 
by intermediary 143.   
Dyilo, who was about to commence questioning of another intermediary 
(intermediary 321), argued that the identity of intermediary 143 was necessary for this 
questioning.  Thus, he argued that the delay in producing intermediary 143 was 
unreasonable.  The Trial Chamber agreed and held that for Dyilo to properly question 
intermediary 321, he needed to know the identity of intermediary 143.  The Court held 
that the delay in producing intermediary 143 was substantial for Dyilo.  In order to move 
the trial forward while at the same time protecting the identity of intermediary 143, the 
Trial Chamber ordered the limited disclosure of the identity of intermediary 143 to 
Dyilo’s counsel and assistants with the express provision that the information obtained 
was not to be disseminated.  The Trial Chamber stayed the order overnight after 
obtaining knowledge that the Prosecutor intended to appeal.  
After deliberating, the Trial Chamber found that there was no increased risk to 
intermediary 143 from limited disclosure of his or her identity and that it was therefore 
not necessary to continue to suspend the order on disclosure pending the filing of an 
 3 
application by the Prosecutor for leave to appeal.  The Trial Chamber ordered the 
Prosecutor to identify intermediary 143 (the First Order of Disclosure).  The Prosecutor 
did not disclose intermediary 143’s identity or ask for an extension of the time limit.  
After dismissing an oral request from the Prosecutor to reconsider the First Order of 
Disclosure, the Trial Chamber again ordered the Prosecutor to disclose the identity of 
intermediary 143 (the Second Order of Disclosure).  Again the Prosecutor failed to 
disclose the required information.  
 The Prosecution then requested a Variation of the Time Limit to Disclose the 
Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further 
Consultations.  The request stated that while the Prosecution had an obligation to comply 
with the Chamber’s instructions, it had an independent statutory obligation to protect 
persons put at risk on account of the Prosecution’s actions and that it should not comply 
or be asked to comply with an order that may require it to violate its separate statutory 
obligation by subjecting the person to a foreseeable risk.  The Trial Chamber took note of 
the Prosecutor’s clearly evidenced intention not to implement the Chamber’s orders if he 
considered that they conflicted with his interpretation of his other obligations and 
observed that the Prosecutor appeared to argue that he had autonomy separate from the 
orders of the Court.  The Court emphasized that the Trial Chamber is the only organ of 
the Court with the power to order and vary protective measures and held that it was 
necessary to stay proceedings as the fair trial of the accused was no longer possible and 
justice could not be done. 
Before the Appeals Chamber the Prosecutor argued that the Trial Chamber erred 
when it concluded that it was necessary to stay the proceedings and it was an abuse of the 
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process of the Court because: (1) the Trial Chamber erred when it found that the 
Prosecutor refused to comply with the Chamber’s orders of 7 July 2010; (2) the Trial 
Chamber erred by misconstruing the position of the Prosecution with respect to its duties 
of protection, finding, as a result, that the Prosecution’s position constituted an 
unjustified intrusion into the role of the judiciary and prevented the Chamber from 
ensuring the fairness of the proceedings and protecting the rights of the accused; and (3) 
the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that the Prosecution’s actions constituted an abuse 
of process and imposed a premature and unnecessary remedy by staying the proceedings.  
In response, Dyilo argued that it was indisputable that the Trial Chamber has 
authority over the Prosecutor with respect to the protection of persons and that the 
exercise of the Prosecutor’s responsibility under Article 68 of the Rome Statute (setting 
out procedures for the "protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in 
the proceedings”) is subject to the authority of the Trial Chamber.  He argued that it was 
unacceptable that the implementation of a judicial decision should be subject to the 
Prosecutor’s discretion and to his personal interpretation of his obligations and of the 
interests at stake.  Finally, he argued that the stay of proceedings was a logical and 
inevitable consequence of the behavior of the Prosecutor: the refusal of the Prosecutor to 
comply with the Trial Chamber’s orders had obstructed the Defense’s effort to 
demonstrate the existence of a concerted plan to manipulate evidence in which the 
Prosecutor was implicated and accordingly made it impossible to conduct a fair trial.  
The Appeals Chamber held that the Prosecutor failed to comply with both Orders 
of Disclosure and remained in noncompliance at the time of the Impugned Decision.  It 
went on to hold that the Prosecutor’s non-compliance was deliberate and that such a 
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wilful non-compliance constituted a clear refusal to implement the orders of the Trial 
Chamber.  The Appeals Chamber went on to hold that the Trial Chamber, subject only to 
the powers of the Appeals Chamber, is the ultimate guardian of a fair and expeditious 
trial and that when there is a conflict between the Prosecutor’s perception of his duties 
and the orders of the Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber’s orders must prevail.  The 
Appeals Chamber further stated that this is a fundamental criterion for any trial to be fair.  
It finally held that there is no exception to the general principle that the Prosecutor (or 
other parties and participants) must follow the orders of the Trial Chamber when it comes 
to issues of protection.  In sum, the Appeals Chamber was not persuaded by the first and 
second errors alleged by the Prosecutor.  It held that the Trial Chamber did not err when 
it found that the Prosecutor refused to comply with the First and Second Orders of 
Disclosure, and that irrespective of whatever duties the Prosecutor may have, he is 
obliged to comply with the orders of the Trial Chamber.  
The Appeals Chamber noted that a stay of proceedings is a drastic remedy and 
that in order for a Trial Chamber to impose a stay of proceedings, it must be impossible 
to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial.  It held that while the actions of 
the Prosecutor threatened not only Dyilo’s right to be tried without undue delay but also 
the fairness of the proceedings as a whole, the Trial Chamber had not yet lost control of 
the proceedings of this case.  The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber had the 
option of imposing sanctions against the Prosecutor, a normal and proper means to bring 
about compliance in the face of refusals to follow the orders of a Chamber.  It thus held 
that a Trial Chamber faced with a deliberate refusal of a party to comply with its orders 
that threatens the fairness of the trial should seek to bring about that party’s compliance 
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through the imposition of sanctions under Article 71 of the Rome Statute before resorting 
to the imposition of a stay of proceedings.  The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s decision, Dyilo remains in custody, and the trial proceedings resumed.   
 
 
 
 
